Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1987

Utah v. John Joseph Thompson : Reply Brief
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
G. Fred Metos; Yengich, Rich, Xaiz and Metos; Attorney for Appellant.
David L. Wilkinson; Attorney General; Barbara Bearnson; Assistant Attorney General; Attorneys for
Respondent.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Utah v. Thompson, No. 870276.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1987).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/1689

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

REPLY
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

:

Case No. 870276

Plaintiff/Respondent,
v.
JOHN JOSEPH THOMPSON,
Defendant/Appellant.

Priority No. 2

THIS IS AN APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION FOR THE
OFFENSES OF OBJECT RAPE, A FIRST DEGREE
FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF TITLE 76, CHAPTER 5,
SECTION 402.2, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953 AS
AMENDED, FORCIBLE SODOMY, A FIRST DEGREE
FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF TITLE 76, CHAPTER 5,
SECTION 403, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953 AS
AMENDED, AND FORCIBLE SEXUAL ABUSE, A SECOND
DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF TITLE 76,
CHAPTER 5, SECTION 404, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED,
1953 AS AMENDED, IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL
DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE JOHN A. ROKICH,
JUDGE PRESIDING.

G. FRED METOS
#2250
YENGICH, RICH, XAIZ & METOS
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
175 East 400 South, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 355-0320
DAVID WILKINSON
Attorney General
BARBARA BEARSON
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
84114

FILED
AUG 81988

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

REPLY
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

:

Case No. 870276

Plaintiff/Respondent,
v.
JOHN JOSEPH THOMPSON,
Defendant/Appellant.

Priority No. 2

THIS IS AN APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION FOR THE
OFFENSES OF OBJECT RAPE, A FIRST DEGREE
FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF TITLE 76, CHAPTER 5,
SECTION 402.2, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953 AS
AMENDED, FORCIBLE SODOMY, A FIRST DEGREE
FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF TITLE 76, CHAPTER 5,
SECTION 403, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953 AS
AMENDED, AND FORCIBLE SEXUAL ABUSE, A SECOND
DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF TITLE 76,
CHAPTER 5, SECTION 404, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED,
1953 AS AMENDED, IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL
DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE JOHN A. ROKICH,
JUDGE PRESIDING.

G. FRED METOS
#2250
YENGICH, RICH, XAIZ & METOS
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
175 East 400 South, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 355-0320
DAVID WILKINSON
Attorney General
BARBARA BEARSON
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
84114

TABLE OF CONTENTS
POINT I - THE COMMENTS BY THE PROSECUTOR RELATING TO A MISSING
WITNESS WERE IMPROPER AND PREJUDICIAL REQUIRING A NEW
TRIAL FOR APPELLANT
1
POINT II - APPELLANT WAS THE SUBJECT OF AN ILLEGAL SENTENCE FOR
THE THREE LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES WHEN HE WAS
ORIGINALLY CHARGED WITH ONLY ONE OFFENSE
7
CONCLUSION

11

CASES CITED
Gass v. United States, 416 F.2d 767 (D.C. Cir. 1969)

4

Griffin v. California. 380 U.S. 609 (1965)

2

State v. Andreason. 718 P.2d 400 (Utah 1986)

2, 5, 6

State v. Baker. 671 P.2d 152 (Utah 1983)

10

State v. Kazda. 540 P.2d 949 (Utah 1975)

1, 2

State v. O'Brien. 721 P.2d 89 (Utah 1986)

11

State v. Porter. 705 P.2d 1174 (Utah 1985)

11

State v. Russell. 733 P.2d 162 (Utah 1987)

9

State v. Smith. 706 P.2d 1052 (Utah 1985)
State v. Suarez, 736 P.2d 1040 (Utah App. 1982)
State v. Tillman. 250 P.2d 546 (Utah 1987)

2, 4
11
8

State v. Valdez. 30 Utah 2d 54, 513 P.2d 422 (1973)

2, 5

United States v. Young. 463 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1972)

3, 4

STATUTES
Utah Code Annotated, §77-35-19(c) (1953 as amended)

8

Utah Code Annotated, §77-35-22(e) (1953 as amended)

9

Utah Code Annotated, §77-35-4(d) (1953 as amended)

10

Utah Code Annotated, §76-1-402(1) (1953 as amended)

10

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

REPLY
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

:

Case No. 870276

Plaintiff/Respondent,
V.

JOHN JOSEPH THOMPSON,
Defendant/Appellant.

Priority No. 2
POINT I

THE COMMENTS BY THE PROSECUTOR RELATING TO A
MISSING WITNESS WERE IMPROPER AND PREJUDICIAL
REQUIRING A NEW TRIAL FOR APPELLANT.
The remarks by the deputy county attorney relating to a
missing witness were improper and prejudicial.

The respondent,

in briefing the issue fails to correctly analyze these remarks as
required by the case law and also fails to correctly assess the
prejudicial impact of the argument.
Respondent contends that the argument was proper under
the standards set forth in State v. Kazda, 540 P.2d 949 (Utah
1975).

In that case the defendant had been arrested late at

night at the scene of a burglary while he was in the process of
removing property from a building.

The prosecutor argued that

the defendant had not presented any evidence relating either to
why he was at the scene of the crime, or what he was doing there.
The court ruled that the State has a right to argue the evidence

Those remarks are set out in full in both appellant's and
respondent's briefs and need not be repeated here. (See Brief of
Appellant at page 8 ) .

or lack of evidence presented by the defendant.

That situation

is significantly different than what occurred in the case at bar.
Here the prosecutor argued that appellant's testimony was not
corroborated by a particular witness raising the inference that
appellant should not be believed.

The appellant, on the other

hand, had explained what he was doing with Rosa Pitman, the
prosecutrix, and why those acts had occurred.
Furthermore, Kazda is inapplicable to this case due to
subsequent

rulings by this court.

The applicable rulings are

found in State v. Smith, 706 P.2d 1052 (Utah, 1985), and in the
line of cases beginning with State v. Valdez, 30 Utah 2d 54, 513
P.2d 422 (1973), and most recently in State v. Andreason, 718
P.2d 400 (Utah 1986).
test:

The general standard requires a two part

(1) Whether the remarks of counsel call the attention of

the jurors to matters they would not be justified in considering; and (2) whether the jurors, in reaching their verdict, were
probably influenced by the improper remarks.
The impropriety of remarks relating to a party's failure to produce particular witnesses is discussed
Smith, supra.

in State v.

Before counsel may argue that an opposing party is

subject to a negative inference from the failure to produce a
particular witness, a two part test must be met:

First, there

The propiety of this is dubious, at best, when those facts are
analyzed in light of the ruling in Griffin v. California, 380
U.S. 609 (1965) (improper for a prosecutor to overtly allude to
the defendant's failure to testify in his own behalf).
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must be a showing that the party who did not produce the witness
had

it peculiarly within his power to produce that witness.

Second, the testimony of that witness would have to elucidate the
issues at trial.
With respect to the first requirement, this court noted
in State v. Smith, supra, that there are two situations that
would make a witness "peculiarly within the power of a party to
produce".

First, there must be a showing that the witness is

physically available only to that party.

Second, that the wit-

ness has the type of relationship with the opposing party that
pragmatically
seeking

renders

to make

the

his testimony unavailable
"missing

witness" argument.

to the party
Respondent

concedes that neither of these situations apply to this case.
Rather, respondent argues that in United States v. Young, 463
F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1972), that court noted there may be

situa-

tions where each side has the capability to physically produce a
witness and the judge may have the discretion to leave the matter open for debate.

The court stated that such argument may be

appropriate without giving an instruction to the jury on the
effect of the failure to call a particular witness.
A claim that this particular passage from United States
v, Young, supra, somehow justifies the prosecutor's remarks in
this case misconstrues what that court was discussing in that
passage.

Respondent also disregards the background relative to

that court's discussion.

With respect to the background, the

rule in the District of Columbia was that prior to closing argu-
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ments counsel was required to request permission from the court
3
to make a missing witness argument.

The passage cited by re-

spondent was written with this notice requirement as a premise.
The prosecutor in this case never requested that he be allowed to
make such an argument nor did he give notice that he intended to
4
make such an argument.
Furthermore,

the

discussion

from

United

States

v.

Young, supra, cited by respondent was made in relation to the
necessity of giving a jury instruction on the inference to be
drawn when a party does not call a particular witness.

In making

the remarks cited by respondent, the Court of Appeals was anticipating that trial courts give the specimen instruction which was
set forth in the court's opinion.

That instruction details the

inferences that are permissible for the jury to draw and the
circumstances that would justify such inferences.
quoted by respondent

The passage

in no way justifies the actions by the

prosecutor in this case.
As for the second portion of the test

in State v.

Smith, supra, respondent argues that the witness referred to by
° See, Gass v. United States, 416 F.2d 767 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
4
At the time this case was tried there was no such notice
requirements as part of Utah law. However, this court may use
this case to take the opportunity to enact such a requirement.
That requirement gives the trial court the opportunity to assess
whether the party seeking to make the argument has met the
requirements of State v. Smith, supra.
5
The entire text of the instruction is attached in "Appendix A".
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the prosecutor would not have elucidated the issues of the case.
If respondent

is correct, there can be no question that the

prosecutor's argument was improper.

It is clear, however, that

the reason that the prosecutor made the argument was to claim
that appellant's testimony has not been corroborated and therefore should not be believed.

As noted in appellant's initial

brief, this case turned on the credibility of either Ms. Pitman
or appellant.

Consequently, the testimony of that witness would

be corroborative of one of the two critical witnesses, rather
than cumulative as respondent contends.

That witness' testimony

would therefore have elucidated the issues at trial.
The final issue that needs to be discussed is that of
the prejudicial effect of the prosecutor's comment.
in Valdez, the question is:

As described

whether the jurors were probably

influenced by the improper remarks.

Respondent concedes that

appellant's description of the law in this state is correct with
respect to the effect of an improper argument being made when the
case

involves conflicting evidence.

See State v. Andreasonf

Q

supra, at 403.

Respondent argues that the prosecutor's comments

were not as egregious as the comments made by prosecutors in
g
other cases.
However, respondent does not analyze the comments
Brief of Respondent at page 13.
7

Brief of Appellant at 12-13.

o

See also Brief of Appellant at page 13.
g
See Brief of Respondent at page 11.

- 5 -

of this prosecutor in light of the critical issue at trial.
previously

noted,

the critical

issue was

appellant as opposed to that of Ms. Pitman,

As

the credibility of
The argument he made

was that part of the testimony given made by appellant which
could have been corroborated by an independent witness was not so
corroborated.

In a case where the evidence is conflicting, such

as this one, the jurors are more susceptible to the influence of
such an remark.

State v. Andreason, supra.

Consequently, the

jurors were probably influenced by the remark.
The other arguments that respondent makes with respect
to the issue of the prejudicial effect of the improper comments
are that the court's jury instructions cured the error and that
the comment was only a small part of the prosecutor's arguments.
With respect to the curative jury instructions, respondent cites
to the instructions stating that the jurors were to be governed
solely by the evidence introduced at trial (R. 87) and the instruction relating to the presumption of innocence and burden of
proof.
sition

(R. 81)

Respondent provides no authority for the propo-

that these particular

created by an improper argument.

instructions cure the prejudice
Furthermore, this argument does

not address the nature of the remarks as they relate to the issue
that the jury had to decide.
Finally, respondent claims that the improper remark was
only one part of a long and detailed argument.

The prosecutor's

argument was long and detailed covering over sixteen pages of
transcript.

(Tr. 259-276)

However, respondent ignores the fact
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that the remark took place at the very end of the argument.
275)

(Tr.

There is less than one page of further argument by the

prosecutor after the improper comment.

The improper remark was

made at a point in the argument where it would have a substantial
impact on the jury.

Respondent disregards where in the closing

argument that the improper comment was made and the potential
effect of such a comment at the end of the closing argument.
The remark by the prosecutor relating to the missing
witness was improper and likely to have influenced the jury's
verdict.

Appellant's conviction should be reversed and the case

remanded to the district court for a new trial.

POINT II
APPELLANT WAS THE SUBJECT OF AN ILLEGAL
SENTENCE FOR THE THREE LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES WHEN HE WAS ORIGINALLY CHARGED WITH
ONLY ONE OFFENSE.
Respondent,
arguments

regarding

alternative charges.

in

its

brief,

the propriety of

misconstrues
sentencing

appellant's
appellant on

Respondent then answers those "straw man"

arguments with correct statements of the law.

Consequently, the

respondent's analysis of this issue simply does not address the
issue raised by appellant.
Appellant does not question that the three offenses for
which he was convicted are lesser and included offenses of the
aggravated sexual assault with which he was originally charged.
Nor does appellant claim that the court's instructions on the
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lesser included offenses were improper.

The critical issue is

whether appellant can be sentenced for three offenses when these
offenses were originally charged as alternatives in the Information.
Respondent argues that appellant waived any right to
raise this issue on appeal because counsel failed to object to
the jury instructions on the lesser offenses.

As authority for

this proposition, respondent cites Utah Code Annotated §77-3519(c) (1953 as amended).

However, that statute addresses only

assigning error to either a portion of the jury instructions as
given or a failure to give a requested instruction to the jury.
That statute does not address how the courts must approach alternative charges, verdicts or sentencing on such charges.
lant does not question
offense instructions.

the propriety of the lesser

Appelincluded

The real issue here is how a court is to

sentence with respect to alternative charges.

Therefore, Utah

Code Annotated, §77-35-19(c) (1953 as amended) offers no guidance
whatsoever in resolving the issue raised by appellant.
Respondent claims that by failing to object to separate
verdicts and by allowing the court to inform the jury that they
may convict of any one or all of the lesser included offenses
appellant waived his right to challenge the sentencing on all
three alternative charges.

As described in appellant's brief the

alternate verdict forms were a necessity.

Those alternatives

were not for a single offense that could be committed in different manners.

See, State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546 (Utah 1987).
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The alternative lesser offenses all are separate crimes.

Each

has individual elements and one has a different punishment. (Two
of the offenses were first degree felonies and one was a second
degree felony).

Consequently, jury unanimity was required for a

finding of guilt on each of the alternative offenses.
verdicts were required for each offense.
P.2d 162 (Utah 1987).

Separate

State v. Russell, 733

An objection to the verdict forms or the

response to the jury's question would not have been appropriate.
Respondent simply disregards the question of separate
elements and different punishments when addressing the waiver
claim.

Likewise, respondent disregards the fact that the claim

involved in this case is that appellant is the subject of an
illegal sentence.

Utah Code Annotated, §77-35-22(e) (1953 as

amended) allows such a sentence to be corrected at any time.

In

other words, there is no such thing as waiver when the court is
addressing a claimed illegal sentence.
Appellant argued in his original brief that the sentencing procedure in this case constituted an improper amendment
to the information.

(See Brief of Appellant at pages 18-19)

Respondent mentions that appellant received concurrent
sentences
on
these
alternative
convictions.
Implicitly
respondent seems to be arguing that there is no harm from this
sentence to appellant. However, the Utah State Board of Pardons
uses guidelines and a time matrix in determining the length of
time an inmate must serve on a prison commitment.
Additional
concurrent convictions have the effect of raising appellant's
guideline used to determine the length of his incarceration by
about 27 months. (See the Board of Pardons time matrix attached
as "Appendix 3").
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Utah Code Annotated, §77-35-4(d) (1953 as amended) prohibits an
amendment to an information or indictment that involves "additional or different" offenses.

Respondent argues that a lesser

included offense is not such an amendment because it does not
involve a different offense.

Appellant does not question the

fact that a lesser included offense is included in the original
charge.

State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152 (Utah 1983)

For that

reason a lesser included offense is not a different charge than
that involved in the original indictment or information.
However, when addressing the amendment issue respondent
simply disregards the first alternative of prohibited amendments
to indictments or informations.

Utah Code Annotated, §77-35-4(d)

(1953 as amended) also prohibits additional offenses from being
charged.

Simple

arithmetic

tells us that when appellant

is

originally charged with one offense and is ultimately sentenced
for three offenses, there has been an amendment to the information resulting in additional charges.

Consequently, sentencing

appellant for all three lesser offenses constitutes an improper
amendment to the information.
Appellant also argued that since he was charged only
with one offense that single charge was by definition a single
criminal episode as defined in Utah Code Annotated, §76-1-402(1)
(1953 as amended).

The result is that appellant could only be

sentenced for one offense.

(See Brief of Appellant at pages 19-

20). Respondent answers that argument citing cases where defendants were charged and convicted of multiple offenses arising out
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of the same episode and those sentences were upheld on appeal.
Respondent again disregards the fact that appellant in this case
12
was charged with only one offense.
That makes the series of
sex acts constituting lesser included offenses a single criminal
episode for purposes of sentencing.
Appellant was illegally sentenced for three offenses
after being charged with only one offense.

This court should

order two of these sentences to be vacated and remand the case to
the district court with an order that appellant be sentenced on
only one of the three lesser included offenses.

CONCLUSION
Based on the improper argument of the prosecutor and
the prejudicial effect of such an argument, appellant's conviction should be reversed and the case remanded to the district
court for a new trial.

Furthermore, the sentences for two of the

lesser included offenses should be vacated and the case should be
remanded to the district with an order that appellant be sen-

State v. Suarez, 736 P.2d 1040 (Utah App. 1987); State v.
O'Brien, 721 P.2d 896 (Utah 1986), State v. Porter, 705 P.2d 1174
(Utah 1985).
12
Whether appellant could have been charged with a separate
offense of aggravated sexual assault for each separate sex act is
not before this court.
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tenced for only one lesser offense.
Dated this

day of August, 1988.

G. FRED METOS
#2250
YENGICH, RICH, XAIZ & METOS
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
175 East 400 South, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 355-0320
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this

day of August, 1988,

I delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing

to Barbara

Bearnson, Assistant Attorney General, at 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84114.
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APPENDIX A

The following is the specimen instruction on missing
witnesses provided in United States v. Young, supra:
Counsel

have

argued

that

you

should

draw

inference from the absence of certain witnesses.

an
The

court has determined that each side had the ability to
produce

the

witnesses.

testimony

of

light

the

on

If

you

conclude

a witness would have
issues,

and

that

cast

it would

that

the

significant
have been

natural for one of the parties to have called that
witness in support of his presentation

if the facts

known by the witness has been favorable to the position
of that party, you may infer that if the witness had
been called he would have given testimony that would
have been unfavorable to that party which failed to
call him.

But you

are not

required

to draw that

inference.

And if you think that it would have been

equally natural for each of the parties to have called
the witness, and that

each might

equally have been

expected to do so, then you may rightly conclude that
since an equal inference could be drawn against each
party, they cancel each other out.

And if the matter

seems doubtful, then you may rightly decide that no
inference

should

be drawn

from

the

absence of the

witness.

In that event, your verdict should be based

on the evidence that was presented in court, and should
not be affected by the witnesses, who were not called.
United States v. Young, supra, at 944.

APPENDIX B

Appellant's History Risk Assessment put him into the
"excellent" category.

The time matrix reflects that his minimum

time of incarceration should be sixty months for a first degree
felony.

When the concurrent alternative commitments for another

first degree felony and second degree sex offense are factored
into the matrix appellant's minimum time of

incarceration is

eighty-seven months, a twenty-seven month difference.
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